And the light shineth in darkness

christian metaphysics and ethics in contrast with today's physicalism

Jan Bauwens • Boek • paperback

• Samenvatting
  Sometimes, the metaphysical question concerning the ultimate ground of being has been restricted to the mere technical question concerning its ultimate building-stones. This is a mistake, because reality is not a construction. Kant says that we can only understand nature to the extend in which we are able to construct it by ourselves; which means, properly, that we are unable to understand nature, because we cannot (re)construct it. Spinoza distinguishes between what is causa sui (God, Nature) and things that have an exterior cause. Also Gödel distinguishes between the creation of something (- out of nothing) and the construction of something (- out of something else which already has been created). Concerning these important warnings, Kant, Spinoza and Gödel have been preceded by Augustinus, who criticises the unbelievers: "Thus, forsooth, [they reason] from their carnal familiarity with the sight of craftsmen and house-builders, and artisans of all descriptions, who have no power to make good the effect of their own art unless they get the help of materials already prepared. And so these parties [i.e.: the unbelievers] in like manner understand the Maker of the world not to be almighty, if thus He could not fashion the said world without the help of some other nature, not framed by Himself, which He had to use as His materials". Even in the case that God created things out of something (- e.g.: 'clay', 'matter unseen', 'matter without form'), He has been the creator of it - thus says Augustinus.
     Apart from art and ethics, we can say that all man-made things are tools, or: extensions of our physical bodies. Our world is an instrument: it is our common, extended body. From nature we recruit the raw material or the elements for that instrument.
     Because our world is a (man-made) construction, we tend to conceive nature in the same way: we tend to see nature as a construction that we can break up into elements in order to build up our world with them. But this is a mistake. Nature in its turn has not been built out of elements that have been retrieved from still somewhere else. Where we do believe so, we conceive ourselves as potential (re)constructors of nature, or as Gods.
     Carnap disapproves of metaphysics for the reason that its propositions are not experimentally verifiable. But the claim of applicability of this principle to the whole of reality, actually veils the conviction that reality can be (re)produced. In Logical Positivism, in Physicalism and in Micro-reductionism, we deal with the misconception Augustinus, Kant, Spinoza and Gödel warn against: the misconception in which man sees himself as God. He is not God, says Spinoza, because he is not causa sui.
   
  By our conception, reality finds its foundation in its destination: all the ‘lower’ things come out of the ‘higher’ wherein they have their reason and their ultimate sense of being. It is our conviction that only in this way, a satisfactory ‘explanation’ of reality as a whole can be obtained.
     Opposed to this conception stands the nowadays as successful as it is malicious conception concerning reality by physicalism, the newest form of materialism, in which things have been turned upside down. Materialism did not understand the cautious words of mentioned philosophers.
     Physicalism is principally a part of atheism, because atheism accepts coincidence while denying any form of teleology: it rejects a priori the question of sense and pretends to find satisfaction in a reductionistic know-how about micro- and macrocosm, which in fact are conceived as if they were nothing more than an accidental happening. It is ethically irresponsible that physicalism leaves man orphaned. In this text however, physicalism will get our attention in the perspective of its cognitive irresponsibility.
     In the perspective as is being developed here, we will express some thoughts concerning physicalism. As a model for critique, we will consider the ‘theory of forms’ by Etienne Vermeersch. We will give a resume of Vermeersch’s basic intuitions. This will be followed by some general objections. We consider Vermeersch’s own version of micro-reductionism, his conception concerning reality in relation to his conception concerning philosophy, his ‘theory of forms’ and, more generally, his physicalism. We point out some failures in Vermeersch’s concept of culture and we fight his thesis of the ability in principle to construct human beings. Eventually, we demonstrate the irrelevance of Vermeersch’ aesthetics which is based on his theory of forms.
• Productinformatie
  Binding : Paperback
  Distributievorm : Boek (print, druk)
  Formaat : 145mm x 210mm
  Aantal pagina's : 176
  Uitgeverij : Jan Bauwens
  ISBN : 907753203
  Datum publicatie : 01-2003
  
• Inhoudsopgave
  Contents:
  CHAPTER 1: REALITY IS NOT A CONSTRUCTION – About the darkness of physicalism 11
  Preface to the first chapter 11
  1.1. Introduction 12
  1.2. Vermeersch’s anthropology and epistemology 16
  Some general remarks 17
  Information is mere ‘information-for-us’ 18
  The instrument is nothing but its ‘function for us’ 19
  Our body as the ultimate parameter of the world 20
  Turing 21
  Purposefulness 21
  Introspection 23
  Does the ability to ‘create’ something imply the complete understanding of that thing? 23
  The gnome in the chest 25
  Brains and thoughts 28
  1.3. The delusion of micro-reductionism 28
  Circular reasoning and contradiction[17] 29
  Accident and contingency 31
  Making music without noise 33
  1.4. Rationality, freedom and creativity 35
  Limited rationality 36
  Creative rationality 37
  Freedom 39
  1.5. The human being is not a machine 40
  Interaction and communication 41
  Action as a function of information 43
  1.6. The circularity of information theory 45
  Form recognition 45
  Needs 46
  Existential contradiction 47
  1.7. Shortcomings of Darwinism 48
  Determinism, teleology, freedom and sense 51
  1.8. The failure of physicalism 54
  Logic 55
  Failures in the physicalistic concept of culture 56
  Nature and Culture 59
  1.9. The physicalist unjustly manipulates Spinoza 62
  1.10. The subject cannot be reduced to an object 63
  1.11. Why the human being cannot be (re)constructed 67
  1.12. An application: the irrelevance of aesthetics found on the ‘theory of forms’ 70
  Conclusions 77
  CHAPTER 2: AND THE LIGHT SHINETH IN DARKNESS – Answering physicalism by means of Christian metaphysics and ethics 79
  Preface to the second chapter 79
  2.1. Introduction 79
  2.2. And the Light shineth in darkness 84
  2.3. The suffering and the soul 94
  ‘Sein’ and ‘Sollen’ 94
  Suffering and thought concerning suffering 96
  Suffering ‘for the sake of’ 97
  The responsibility for the suffering of others 98
  The ‘mind-body problem’ 100
  Immortal soul 104
  The irreducible subject 105
  Ethical identification 106
  The ‘objective evil’ 106
  The meaning of suffering 108
  Ethics, the life-breath of the soul 109
  The freedom of the will 110
  2.4. Reality and delusion 111
  Perception is perception of sense 113
  Idea and thing 114
  Life necessarily leads to consciousness 115
  Perception, acknowledgement and knowledge 120
  Perception and love 122
  Plato, Aristoteles, Thomas and perception 123
  Reality concerning faith, justice and sense 126
  The ‘higher’ perceptions found the ‘lower’ ones 127
  Our world is our wages 130
  The sense of suffering 131
  The living and the death 131
  Soul and reality as an absolute creation 133
  2.5. Unlimited, impenetrable order 135
  Beauty 137
  Beautiful acting 138
  The essence of art 139
  Sanctity and Love 140
  Metaphor 143
  2.6. Reason and faith 147
  2.7. God 148
  Abstract 150
  Literature 152
  Notes 156
  VAN DEZELFDE AUTEUR 170
• Reviews (0 uit 0 reviews)
  Wil je meer weten over hoe reviews worden verzameld? Lees onze uitleg hier.